By Jennifer Ann Thomas, for Valor — São Paulo
19/08/2026

There is a paradox at the heart of Brazil’s race to develop critical minerals for the energy transition. The companies currently seeking to bring lithium, copper, rare earths, potash and green iron projects to fruition have world-class reserves, but they all face the same obstacle: financing.

To access public credit lines, companies must offer guarantees tied to assets already in operation, something a company still in the development or construction phase does not have. Without this collateral, capital ends up coming from abroad, particularly from stock exchanges in Australia and Canada, where the mineral resource itself can serve as collateral.

The obstacle is not geology. Brazil has mineral reserves capable of supplying the energy transition, but each project takes six to ten years to move from concept to operation. This timeline discourages capital and causes Brazil to lose ground to competitors. BNDES is seeking alternatives to create an ecosystem focused on financing the sector, according to José Luiz Gordon, the bank’s Director of Productive Development, Innovation and Foreign Trade, in a report on page 34. In addition, the country is discussing a new regulatory framework for critical and strategic minerals, which promises greater predictability and credit instruments for new projects.

These were among the issues discussed at a roundtable organized by Valor with the support of the Brazilian Mining Institute (Ibram) and moderated by Francisco Góes, Head of Valor’s Rio de Janeiro newsroom, and Celia Rosemblum, Editor of Special Projects at Valor. The discussion brought together Eduardo De Come, Vice President of Ero; Sérgio Leite, President of Potássio do Brasil; Vinícius Alvarenga, CEO of Companhia Brasileira de Lítio (CBL); Emerson Souza, Vice President of Institutional Relations at Brazil Iron; Renato Gonzaga, Brazil President of Borborema Recursos Estratégicos; Marisa Cesar, Director of Corporate Affairs and Sustainability at PLS Brasil; Douglas de Souza Baldo, Chief Financial, Risk and IT Officer at Mineração Taboca; and Pablo Cesário, Interim CEO of Ibram. Below are the main excerpts.

Valor: What are Brazil’s opportunities and challenges in the critical minerals sector?

Eduardo De Come: Copper is already recognized as the main conductor of electricity. Electrification, wind and solar power, and more recently artificial intelligence and data centers, will cause global consumption to jump from 25 million to 40 million tonnes per year. Brazil, however, is not a significant player. We have Vale as the main producer and smaller companies such as Ero. We export 100% of what we produce and import 100% of the cathode used by industry to manufacture wires and tubes, which leaves us dependent on a refining industry concentrated in China, which controls almost 70% of global refining capacity. We are experiencing the highest copper prices in history, and for companies, that is not a problem. From the country’s perspective, however, the government will have to decide whether it wants to encourage greater vertical integration of the supply chain.

Sérgio Leite: The fact that fertilizers have been elevated to the category of critical and strategic minerals is a decisive step, as it highlights an imbalance that few people are aware of. Today, we import 95% of the potash we consume, even though Brazil is the country that feeds the world the most in terms of protein production. The project we are developing in Autazes, Amazonas, should reduce this dependence to around 70% and change the logistics of supply. Potash takes between 100 and 120 days to reach consumers when it comes from Canada, Russia and Belarus. With Autazes, that will fall to three or four days, creating value linked to the country’s food security.

Vinícius Alvarenga: Lithium faces the same difficulties as the Brazilian mining industry as a whole: a high tax burden, outdated labor legislation for underground mining and a renewable energy matrix that is poorly distributed. In the Jequitinhonha Valley, the energy is available, but it takes too long to reach the projects. There is also a lack of appropriate funding, since the sector has many junior miners that need capital, while the collateral required by public financing programs is generally only within the reach of large mining companies. Today, around 85% of global lithium goes to electric vehicles and 10% to stationary batteries, a segment that is expected to grow three to four times faster than vehicle electrification over the next decade. The outlook is excellent, but there is not enough supply to meet such demand. And lithium’s main application today is not batteries, but healthcare. Without pharmaceutical-grade lithium carbonate, which supplies Brazil’s public healthcare system, many people would face serious psychiatric problems.

Renato Gonzaga: The Monte Alto project, which we are developing in Bahia, is one of the leading rare earth projects globally and has a particular feature. From the outset, it has aimed to move one step further along the value chain. In the first stage, we will produce a mixed rare earth carbonate, and later we plan to build an oxide separation plant, generating products such as NdPr, which accounts for 85% of the market. Any company proposing to do this is already talking about billions of dollars in capital. Brazil has energy, reagents, logistics and ports in its favor, but what is missing is bankability. That is why capital is coming from Australia, where we are publicly listed, because this depth of market does not exist here.

Marisa Cesar: We participated in the BNDES and Finep call for proposals, which approved 56 projects, 45 of which went through all the stages. The problem is that to access these credit lines, whether from the Climate Fund or the Innovation Fund, companies need guarantees tied to assets such as plants and production facilities, which companies still in the exploration or development phase do not have. In Australia, the government provides grants, non-repayable funding, of around US$50 million to support the initial processing stage. We do not have such an instrument here.

Emerson Souza: I would bring in an indirect connection: green iron, HBI and direct reduced iron. Steelmaking accounts for 8% of global greenhouse gas emissions, and there is no green steel without suitable iron feedstock. Only 3% of the world’s iron ore is suitable for this purpose. With Europe’s carbon pricing and the subsidies that Europe and Asia are providing for decarbonization, a deficit of 109 million tonnes per year of this high-purity iron is projected from 2030 onward. It is still somewhat outside the critical minerals discussion, but it will become a central issue.

Douglas de Souza Baldo: At Mineração Taboca, we produce tin for solder used in electronic components, tinplate, which coats food cans, and tantalum, which is used in semiconductors. We export 90% of our tin and 100% of our tantalum, always as refined metal, never as raw concentrate. Last year, we were acquired by a Chinese group and, a few weeks ago, during a meeting with the China Development Bank, I received a financing offer without even having requested one. This race started a long time ago.

Valor: Why is public financing not reaching these companies, even when their projects have already been approved?

Vinícius Alvarenga: We were approved for both the Climate Fund and Finep’s Innovation Fund, but we will not be able to access the money. Even with production and a plant in operation, BNDES does not accept the mineral resource itself as collateral. It requires traditional collateral, such as a guarantee from a major bank, and this makes the financing so expensive that it is cheaper to seek funding abroad.

Marisa Cesar: The same happened with projects that already have preliminary and installation licenses, as ours does. We have an international credit facility involving more than 12 banks and bonds issued in the United States. It is difficult for a Brazilian company to justify using BNDES when the collateral structure required here is more complex than what we can obtain abroad.

Renato Gonzaga: Perhaps the Brazilian financial market lacks both depth and knowledge of the sector itself. When you are able to provide the collateral required, that is a sign that you no longer need BNDES. That is why companies turn to Australian and Canadian capital markets, where there are stock exchanges specifically focused on mining and an established instrument known as resource-based lending, which accepts the mineral resource itself as collateral.

Pablo Cesário: This is an essential point. Seventy percent of mining investment in Brazil comes from foreign capital. In critical minerals, that figure rises to 80%. Today, the country simply does not have financing capacity commensurate with what the sector needs. BNDES is welcome, but it is far from meeting this demand, just as was the case in Canada and Australia before they changed their policies.

Sérgio Leite: One positive development is that BNDESPar, BNDES’s investment arm, has resumed operations after being absent for years. This is the kind of equity financing that Americans have been using to unlock their own strategic projects.

Vinícius Alvarenga: But this cannot be the only answer to the collateral problem, because not everyone will want to bring BNDES in as an equity partner.

Sérgio Leite: I agree, but it is certainly a welcome sign.

Valor: How do you view the Brazilian government’s intention to deepen the mining value chain, attract investment and address the issue of nationalism in the sector?

Vinícius Alvarenga: There is a mistaken argument that the mineral resource must remain in the country to guarantee the development of the industry in Brazil. For all of us, if the value chain were more developed and there were a robust domestic market, it would be much better to sell domestically. It is much better than exporting large portions of production, and you have a financing structure in place. From a tax perspective, selling in Brazil is also much more advantageous than exporting because of the offsetting of tax credits and debits. So there is no need to create incentives for us to sell in Brazil. We will sell in Brazil. But each player has its own position within the value chain.

Renato Gonzaga: There is also a lack of understanding of the industries themselves among those who formulate legislation. Lithium, for example, is a chemical industry. Rare earths are a chemical industry. So when we talk about producing a product, whether a concentrate or a separated oxide, it involves a series of stages. To produce a separated oxide, there are nearly a thousand unit operations. There is a lack of understanding when everything is put into the same category as iron ore. It is not all the same. When we talk about lithium or rare earths, setting up such an industry requires a chemical industry with a thousand highly refined steps requiring extensive technical expertise. Each company, according to its strategy, will decide where to stop, but each of these steps represents significant value addition. There is substantial investment involved, creating value for Brazilians. I believe everything is too often lumped together under the argument that value is simply being sent abroad.

Eduardo De Come: There is some confusion because mining tends to be viewed only as extractive activity, but it is already a sophisticated industry. All the metals we have mentioned require enormous amounts of technology to produce. Sometimes we go to the states and hear about the benefits of verticalizing the value chain. The question is economic. How much does it cost to move one step further along the chain? What return do I get? When you compete with China and other countries that operate at a much larger scale, you realize that moving one step further may add scale but actually destroy value. It is better to stop and sell the concentrate. That is the case with rare earths. You become dependent on other raw materials, specialized labor, equipment, licensing and so many other factors that the value added by that additional step may not justify the investment.

Vinícius Alvarenga: If you divide the market into upstream, midstream and downstream, with downstream being finished applications and midstream comprising refineries, smelters and chemical processing plants along the way, what China did was first invest heavily in demand. This created midstream capacity that discourages private players from investing in their own countries. In other words, China engaged in strategic dumping by creating excess capacity. Today, in lithium, there is around 40% unused capacity in the midstream segment. So how do you break this cycle? The competitor cannot do it on its own. It would require a geopolitical decision by someone willing to create a midstream supply chain. The entire world talks about a “China-free” supply chain, but nobody is willing to pay for it. For the private sector, it does not make economic sense to compete against this enormous amount of idle capacity in China across so many segments. By investing heavily in midstream capacity, China created a strategic form of protection.

Pablo Cesário: There are distortions and unfair practices in this market that limit competition. Solutions include minimum prices or strategic regulatory stockpiles that provide long-term predictability.

Sérgio Leite: It is worth remembering how China achieved this lead. I lived in China for six years, about 30 years ago, when I took Vale there. Even at that time, I was impressed by the number of African students at China’s leading universities, many of whom became fluent in Mandarin within a few months. China identified decades ago who would be its suppliers of mineral resources, trained those people, created markets for its products and offered to build local infrastructure. It is a long-term strategic effort that Brazil still does not know how to replicate.

Valor: How is the bill establishing the regulatory framework for critical and strategic minerals progressing?

Pablo Cesário: We achieved something rare: a bill that received support from the government, the Workers’ Party (PT) and the Liberal Party (PL) at the same time, on an issue with extremely high political sensitivity. The bill establishes governance for the sector and goes further than we expected in terms of incentives. There are approximately R$5 billion in direct tax credits, and if the mining sector achieves the same level of utilization that the infrastructure sector has achieved with incentivized debentures, this could represent another R$22 billion in benefits. There are still points to be adjusted. The article establishing the critical minerals council gives it very broad powers, without clear parameters regarding timing or scope. Its role should be limited to registering and monitoring projects, as provided for by the Constitution, rather than screening investments.

Vinícius Alvarenga: If the powers of this council are not clearly defined, everyone will be concerned about investing here. That is the question that really matters.

Pablo Cesário

Marisa Cesar: Progress on environmental licensing is also decisive. If the new special license for critical minerals, with a 12-month timeframe, is approved, it will change foreign investors’ perception of Brazil.
When we brought our Australian partners to meet with the government, it was precisely this regulatory predictability that convinced them to acquire the project here.

Valor: How should Brazil leverage its mineral reserves in trade negotiations at a time of heightened tensions between the United States and China?

Marisa Cesar: We need a state policy for critical minerals, rather than isolated arrangements that each company negotiates individually with the United States, the European Union or the United Kingdom. These countries have two things that we lack — money and technology — while we have the mineral resources. If we build this ecosystem with a clear strategy, we could become the oil of the 21st century, or a new agricultural powerhouse.

Pablo Cesário: The challenge now is to create a framework that brings together, on one side, major mining countries such as Brazil, Australia, Canada, Indonesia and Chile, and, on the other, the major consumer powers.
Brazil has an advantage that none of these other countries has: it can engage on an equal footing with the Chinese, Americans and Europeans. It is not unlike what led to the creation of the International Energy Agency or OPEC. We could think about something like a mineral OPEC.

Vinícius Alvarenga: Unlike oil, however, two-thirds of the world’s mineral midstream capacity is currently in China. Even if producer countries join forces on the supply side, the entire world is up against China when it comes to processing. Even the Americans do not have enough money to single-handedly support a minimum price for all minerals.

Pablo Cesário: Even so, having a seat at the table gives us leverage, and China will also need our resources at some point. In the case of tantalum, for example, the alternative is the Democratic Republic of Congo, which faces armed conflict. It is not an easy bet, but it is the option we have.

Valor: What perception does Brazilian society have of the mining sector?

Vinícius Alvarenga: Brazilian mining is the most sustainable in the world. Our electricity matrix is almost entirely renewable, and water recirculation in sensitive operations, such as those in the Jequitinhonha Valley, exceeds 90%. The problem is that we have never engaged in dialogue with society in the way other sectors have. This feeds the misconception that mining is an extractive activity with low value added, when in fact it is a sophisticated industry that invests in research and employs highly qualified professionals.

Eduardo De Come: And it is worth reinforcing this point. Mining is already a sophisticated industry, not simply extractive activity, and everything we produce carries enormous technological content and value addition. There is value in the industry as it is, and it is not always necessary to deliver the finished product for the industry to be relevant.

Marisa Cesar: And yet mining is held to a higher standard than other sectors, although this does not reach the media in the same way. At PLS, from the moment we arrive in a territory, we carry out what we call mining literacy with directly affected communities, in addition to investing in the municipality even before any production begins.

Valor: What is the main obstacle preventing these critical minerals projects from getting off the ground quickly?

Eduardo De Come: Brazil can be a global leader in upstream activities — extraction — for most metals. I have more doubts about full vertical integration in the short term, but if we unlock financing and infrastructure, investment will accelerate. Today, it takes two to three years to build a transmission line, and we train too few engineers and geologists. In Brazil, less than 15% of graduates in science and technology enter the sector, compared with up to 80% in China. Without taking a long-term view, we risk repeating a “chicken flight” — a short-lived takeoff that quickly loses altitude.

Renato Gonzaga: If Brazil truly wants to become a leading player in the global energy-transition value chain, whether in artificial intelligence, batteries or electric vehicles, the path is integration, not isolation. This requires regulatory predictability, which translates into a lower cost of capital. Geological potential is not the problem. What is missing is decision-making.

Marisa Cesar: Speed and agility in decision-making are also lacking. We need a state policy that drives projects already underway and provides greater technical capacity to agencies such as the National Mining Agency (ANM) and the Geological Service of Brazil, which has currently mapped only 27% of the country’s territory. Without this mapping, it is difficult even to assess the potential that the country has.

Source: A Conversation on Brazil’s Unique Moment in Critical Minerals Exploration